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The Expanding Scope of
Accountants' Liability to Third Parties
Arthur J. Marinelli, Jr.
In increasing numbers, accountants are finding themselves defending
against claims brought by investors and creditors who have suffered fi-
nancial loss in transactions in which they relied on financial reports and
statements prepared by the accountants. The author surveys the re-
cent developments in case law and federal legislation which have been
at the core of this expanding liability. After examining and analyzing
the impact of common law, federal securities legislation, and federal
criminal statutes, the author concludes that the expanded liability and
potential litigation should cause the accounting profession to upgrade
the care and objectivity employed in the preparation of financial state-
ments.
I. INTRODUCTION
HE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION of the independent public ac-
countant is the examination of his client's financial statements
and the certification of reports diagnosing the fiscal health of
that business. The statements are then widely disseminated and re-
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In recent years, there has been
lied on by investors and credi-
tors in determining the advisa-
bility of placing their financial
trust in the business. Millions
of credit and investment dollars
are advanced annually in reli-
ance on accountants' diagnoses.'
Therefore, while accounting is
not a perfect science, the state-
ments are expected to be free
of severe distortions.
an increasing number of claims
brought against accountants by creditors and investors alleging loss
due to the auditors' failure to perform their analyses properly.2
There is little doubt that accounting firms are now thought of as a
source of salvage when credit losses occur or investments go sour.3
The proper limits of an accountant's liability to third parties has
' Meek, Liability of the Accountant to Parties Other Than His Employer for Negli-
gent Misrepresentation, 1942 WIs. L. REV. 371.
2 See Heinemann, Accountant Role Undergoing Test, N.Y. Times, March 27, 1966,
§ 3, at 1, col. 3.
3 Wall Street J., Nov. 15, 1966, at 13, col. 2.
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been a subject of controversy under both the common law and fed-
eral securities legislation.4  This article will examine that contro-
versy, inquiring into the accountant's legal duties in his relationship
with his client, the liability which may result from misfeasance in
performing those duties, and the limits to which that liability will
be extended to third parties affected by the accountant-client rela-
tionship.
II. LIABILITY OF THE PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANT TO His CLIENT
The duty owed by an accountant to his client depends upon the
agreement he has made with the client. Audit engagements are
usually informally contracted, and evidenced by "an engagement
memo" in the accountant's working papers. The agreement usually
sets out in detail the limits of the undertaking, especially where some
of the work required in the customary audit is to be eliminated.5
Implicit in every contract for employment is the duty to perform the
contracted services with the skill to be expected of a reasonably pru-
dent man possessing the accountant's training and knowledge.6 This
contractual standard is an adoption of the standard of care imposed
by courts in negligence suits, 7 and is the standard applied in negli-
gence cases involving lawyers, doctors, and other professional
men.8  As in these other professions, the services rendered by ac-
countants are considered highly skilled and, in theory at least, are
governed by personally enforced professional standards of perfor-
mance and codes of ethics. The legal standard then imposed reflects
the judicially-ascribed opinion that while those who hire profession-
als are not justified in expecting infallibility, they do have the right
to expect reasonable care and the ordinary skill and competence of
the members of that profession.9
4 See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1964); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1964).
5 Litigation can arise because of disagreements as to the specific services contem-
plated by the parties to the contract. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cook, 35 F.
Supp. 160 (E.D. Mich. 1940); National Surety Corp. v. Sybrand, 256 App. Div. 226, 9
N.Y.S.2d 554 (1939); O'Neill v. Atlas Auto Financing Corp., 139 Pa. Super. 346, 11
A.2d 782 (1939).
6 Note, The Accouantant's Liability for What and to Whom, 36 IOwA L. REV. 319,
320 (1951).
7 See, eg., Baveroft v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 203 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Ga. 1962),
aff'd 309 F.2d 959 (Sth Cir. 1962).
8 Atkins v. Crosland, 406 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
9 Lindner v. Barlow, Davis and Wood, 210 Cal. App. 2d 660, 665, 27 Cal. Rptr.
101, 104 (1st App. Dist. 1962).
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Liability to the client will arise whenever the conduct of the ac-
countant falls below the standards of his profession, and may be
based on breach of contract,'0 fraud or negligence. The accoun-
tant's work in a particular case will be judged against auditing stan-
dards and procedures which have been developed by the accounting
profession itself speaking through the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants. Auditing procedures relate to the acts to
be performed by the accountant in the audit, while standards deal
with measures of the quality of the performance of those acts and the
objective to be attained by the use of the procedures undertaken."
Thus, the failure to follow certain procedures may result in negli-
gence in the audit in one set of circumstances but will not result in
negligence under a different set of circumstances. Because of the
highly technical nature of the literature involved, expert account-
ing testimony will usually be necessary to establish whether account-
ing standards and principles have been followed.' 2  If the task
which should have been performed is obvious even to a layman,
however, liability can be established without expert testimony.13
The only acceptable defense will be a showing that due care was
exercised in the audit, and that the procedures were reasonable in
light of the current professional practices. An important piece of
evidence, crucial to the defense, will be the accountant's detailed,
comprehensive and carefully prepared working papers.' 4
The greatest number of litigated claims between accountants
and clients arise from the accountant's failure to discover defalca-
10 See text accompanying note 6 supra. All actions by clients against accountants
involve both negligence and breach of contract. In an appropriate case, damages will
be limited to the amount paid in compensation to the accountant rather than the more
extensive recovery allowed under a negligence theory. See Board of County Comm'rs
of Allen County v. Baker, 152 Kan. 164, 102 P.2d 1006 (1940) (full recovery of
consideration paid to accountants when performance insufficient for the purposes con-
templated under the contract); Craig v. Anyon, 212 App. Div. 55, 208 N.Y.S. 259, aff'd
without op. 242 N.Y. 569, 152 N.E. 431 (1925) (recovery limited to consideration paid
because negligence of accountants not sole proximate cause of the losses); East Grand
Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296, 141 N.W. 181 (1913) (recovery limited to consider-
ation paid because special circumstances which would give accountants reason to know
of the losses were not shown).
"See CoMM. ON AUDITING PROcEDURE, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF -ERTIFIED
PUBLIC AccouNTANTs, AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, No. 33, at 15
(1963).
12 See Kurland, Accountant's Legal Liability: Ultramares to BarChris, 25 Bus.
LAWYER 155, 157 (1969).
13 Id.
14 Coakley, Accountants Legal Liability, 126 J. ACCOUNTANCY, No. 1, July; 1968,
at 58, 59.
19711
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:113
tions on the part of the client's employees.' The ordinary examina-
tion, directed to an expression of an opinion on financial state-
ments, is, of course, not aimed primarily at discovering these crimes.
Yet, the independent auditor will be responsible for undetected fraud
where the non-detection clearly results from his failure to comply
with generally accepted auditing standards.'"
While neither as clear nor as certain as the duty owed to a client,
liability to third parties can arise. Because of the greater uncer-
tainty, and greater potential recoveries, liability to third parties is a
potentially more disruptive factor in the accountant's business. The
balance of this article is devoted to a close analysis of the law sur-
rounding this third-party liability.
III. AUDITOR'S LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES
Traditionally, accountants have been almost totally insulated
from "non-client" claims by the "rule of privity," which permits
sustaining a claim for contractual negligence only when the plaintiff
was in privity of contract with the defendant. The common law al-
lowed this obstacle to be surmounted only where there was proof
of actionable fraud.' 7  Gradually, the courts found themselves soft-
ening the harshness of this rule in specific cases by the factual find-
ing that the negligence was "gross negligence" or "recklessness"
sufficient to support an action in the nature of fraud.'i Because of
this judicial device, however, the laws of fraud and negligent mis-
representation have become inextricably entangled. 9
Concern over the accountant's traditional relative immunity from
third-party claims has resulted in consideration being given to ex-
panding the class to whom the accountant owes a duty of care, or
to redefining the concept of fraud to encompass acts heretofore con-
sidered harmful but not actionable. This expansion and redefinition
,
5 See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cook, 35 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Mich. 1940);
Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116 (1934);
Levitin, Accountants' Scope of Liability for Defective Financial Reports, 15 HASTINGS
L.J. 436, 438 (1964).
10 Board of County Comm'rs of Allen County v. Baker, 152 Kan. 164, 102 P.2d 1006
(1940); see also Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 324, 338 (1957).
17 Note, Accountants' Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial Statements, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (1967).
18See, e.g., State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
This case is discussed in greater detail in the text accompanying note 55 infra.
19 See, e.g., Katsoris, Accountants' Third Party Liability: How Far Do We Go?, 36
FORDHAm L. REv. 191, 193 (1967).
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have been proceeding under both the common law20 and federal
securities regulations.2
A. Common Law Liability for Negligence
The landmark case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche22 still stands
as the predominant authority in the area of accountants' liability to
third parties. In Ultramares, public accountants were employed by
the Stern Company to perform the yearly audit of the company's
books and to prepare a certified balance sheet. The accountants knew
that Stern's operation demanded large amounts of credit and that
Stern would circulate the certified balance sheet to bankers and sup-
pliers, but did not know the identity or number of persons who
would use the balance sheet. The accountants overvalued the com-
pany's assets and the overvaluation was incorporated in the balance
sheet upon which the plaintiff, a creditor of the company, relied
in extending credit to Stern. After Stern had failed, the plaintiffs
sought recovery from the accountants for the losses sustained and
alleged that the accountants' misrepresentations were both negli-
gent and fraudulent.
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Cardozo had no difficulty
finding negligence on the part of the accountants. He was con-
cerned, however, with the adverse effects of holding accountants
accountable to unforeseen third parties. Accordingly, the decision
followed the rule of privity and held that an accountant is liable
for negligence only to the party with whom he has made a contract
for services, or to a party whom the accountant knew, at the time
when the statements were prepared, would rely on them.
The holding in Ultramares, relying once more on the shield of
privity, seems inconsistent with other opinions by Judge Cardozo
in which he appeared to disfavor the entire notion of privity. Prior
to Ultramares, the general rule of privity had been weakened in tort
law by the doctrine of "dangerous instrumentalities." The privity
element was not required when the alleged negligence involved
articles which were inherently dangerous and likely to put human
life in imminent danger.- Judge Cardozo himself was a central
figure in the expansion of the doctrine, once holding that the
manufacturer would be liable for articles "reasonably certain" to
20 See text accompanying notes 22-66 infra.
2 1 See text accompanying notes 67-123 infra.
22 255 N.Y. 170,174 NE. 441 (1931).
2 3 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 409 (1852).
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imperil life and limb when negligently made, if that manufacturer
knew that the article would be used by someone other than the im-
mediate purchaser.24  In Glanzer v. Shepard,2" Cardozo carried this
assault on the citadel of privity out of the personal injury field and
into the arena of economic and business loss. The defendants in
Glanzer were certified public weighers who had negligently weighed
and certified a shipment of beans. It was later shown that the ship-
ment weighed much less than the defendants had certified, and
thus was worth much less than the plaintiffs had paid. Although the
defendants had been contracted and paid by the seller, the court
held them liable to the plaintiff-buyer because it was for that buy-
er's ultimate use that the certification was made.26
At first glance, it would seem that Glanzer could have been ap-
plied by analogy in the later Ultramares situation. The primary
elements were remarkably similar: A contracts B to make a mea-
surement (assessment) of A's product (business) and to certify
that measurement as accurate. C then relies on that measurement
in extending money for A's product (business). The Ultramares
court distinguished Glanzer, however, on the grounds that the ser-
vice rendered by the defendant in Glanzer was primarily for the
benefit of a third person who was, in effect if not in name, a party
to the contract, and was only incidentally rendered for the benefit
of the formal promisee. Ultramares differed in that the service was
rendered primarily for the benefit of the Stern Company, the for-
mal promisee, and only incidentally or collaterally for the use of
those who might later see the statements. Cardozo observed that
foresight of the possibility of later reliance does not necessarily
create liability for negligence, even though such foresight may be
material in terms of liability for fraud.27 But this distinction can
be criticized as artificial. The client is going to be financially bene-
fited by being able to more readily obtain credit, but likewise
many creditors and shareholders not only use but require a report
and certificate of the books and financial records by an indepen-
dent accountant.28 Real benefit accrues to creditors and sharehold-
ers from an independent accountant's certificates and services. Un-
der a pure tort theory, the harm to the plaintiffs in both Glanzer
24 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
25 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
26 233 N.Y. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275.
27 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446.
28 Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A Modern Study of Accountants' Liability to the
Public, 18 DEPAUL L REV. 56, 73-74 (1968).
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and Ultramares seems to fall within the foreseeability or "risk rea-
sonably to be perceived" rule of tort liability for negligence.29
Harm in both Ultramares and Glanzer was foreseeable even though,
in Ultramares, the actual persons likely to rely on the defendants'
certified balance sheet were unknown, while the reliance in Glan-
zer was limited to one party who was known by the defendant.
The court's refusal to extend liability to third parties in Ultra-
mares can, with a fair degree of certainty, be attributed to an appar-'
ent policy determination that all imposed or assumed risks should
be calculable. As Judge Cardozo stated: "If liability for negligence
exists [between accountants and unknown third parties), a thought-
less slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the
cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class." 30  But one can ask whether the indeterminate nature of this
sort of risk in this profession is any more fearsome than the specula-
tive nature of the risks facing any profession. The use of liability
insurance among public accounting firms and the ability of the pro-
fession to pass the costs of such insurance on to its customers, who in
turn can pass on the cost to the entire consuming public, seems to cast
doubt on the necessity of the Ultramares decision.
The most unfortunate aspect of the Ultramares case is its subse-
quent treatment. Almost without exception courts have applied
the Ultramares decision in a mechanical fashion," implying that
Ultramares allows no room for imposing on "accountants a duty of
care running to third parties in cases involving negligent misrepre-
sentation. One example of the mechanical application of the rule
can be found in the English case of Candler v. Crane, Christmas &
Co. 32  In Candler the accountants prepared a balance sheet for
their client and were told to exhibit it to a prospective investor
when completed. The accountants personally put the balance
sheet before the investor who then invested in the company in reli-
ance on facts contained in the balance sheet. The accountants
had negligently failed to check certain assets which, if properly re-
viewed, would have revealed a state of fiscal ill-health. The com-
pany later became insolvent, and the investor brought an action
for negligence against the accountants to recover his original in-
2 9 Note, Potential Liability of Accountants to Third Parties for Negligence, 41 ST.
JOHN'S L REV. 558, 592 (1967).
30 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
31 See Levitin, supra note 15, at 447.
32 [19513 2 KB. 164 (CA.).
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vestment. The court, in a two to one decision, held for the defen-
dants citing Ultramares for the proposition that accountants are
not liable to third parties for their negligent misrepresentations.
In a critique of the decision, Professor Seavey has pointed out that
the analogy to Ultramares was poorly drawn, and that Glanzer
should have been the authority used.3" In Candler, as in Glanzer,
the plaintiff was actually foreseen and the class of plaintiffs was
limited.
Lord Denning, in a critical dissenting opinion in Candler, had
concluded that an accountant's duty should extend to cases "where
the accountant prepares his accounts and makes his report for the
guidance of the very person in the very transaction in question."3
His view was subsequently adopted by The House of Lords in Hed-
ley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners.35 In that decision, Candler
was deemed to be "a typical case of agreeing to assume a liability:
[the defendant accountants] knew why the plaintiff wanted to
see the accounts and why their employers . ..wanted them to be
shown to him, and agreed to show them to him without even a sug-
gestion that he should not rely on them."36
Although Hedley Byrne dealt specifically with a banker's re-
port to a third party on the financial responsibility of one of its
customers, the language of the House of Lords was expressly in-
tended to apply to any person possessed of a special skill who was
trusted by a third party to utilize that skill, when he knew, or ought
to have known, that reliance was being placed on him." This is an
important, but limited, modification of the liability of accountants
for professional negligence. The rule enunciated in Hedley Byrne
would impose on accountants a duty of care owed to persons other
than those with whom the accountant is in a contractual or fidu-
ciary relationship. He may be liable for neglect of that duty if,
but only if, he knows or ought to know that a financial report, ac-
count or statement prepared by him has been prepared for a specific
purpose or transaction, will be shown to a particular person or class
33 Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas and Co. - Negligent Misrepresentation by
Accountants, 67 LAw Q. REv. 466 (1951).
34 (1951] 2 K.B. 164, 183 (C.A.).
35 [1964) A.C. 465 (1963).
36 Id. at 487 (Lord Reid).
37 While all the Lords agreed on this point in theory, they held that the defendant
was not liable in this particular case. No duty of care arose because the defendants
expressly disclaimed responsibility for the reliability of the facts they reported.
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of persons, and may be relied on by that person or class of persons
in that particular connection."
The subsequent interpretation of the Ultramares case has been
questioned not only in England in Candler and Hedley Byrne, but
has come under attack in this country as well. In Rusch Factors,
Inc. v. Levin,39 a corporation sought financing from a commercial
banking and factoring corporation. The bank requested certified
financial statements which were then prepared by the defendant-ac-
countant. The corporation was insolvent when the accountant
negligently prepared his statement, but the bank relied on the certi-
fied statement to the contrary. The loan was not paid and the
bank sued the accountant. In holding that "an accountant should
be liable in negligence for careless financial misrepresentations re-
lied upon by actually foreseen and limited classes of persons, ' '40
the court emphasized the qualitative difference between liability to
an undefined, unlimited class envisioned in Ultramares, and liabil-
ity to a plaintiff who was a single party whose reliance was, in fact,
foreseen. In this respect the plaintiff in Rusch Factors was found
to be similar to the plaintiff in Glanzer.41 The court further ques-
tioned the decision in Ultramares:
38 Accountants' Liability to Third Parties - The Hedley Byrne Decision, 120 J.
Acou, ANcy, Oct., 1965, at 66-67.
39 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.CR.I. 1968).
40 Id. at 93.
41 Id. at 90, 91. The court did not have to overrule Ultramares since it found that
the facts fit Glanzer rather than Ultramares. The Rusch Factors holding has been
adopted by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Ryan v. Kanne, ___ Iowa , 170 N.W.2d
395 (1969). Additional factors of interest in this case include the court's rejection of the
defense that the accountant's report was uncertified, and the court's method of comput-
ing damages.
Lack of certification was rejected as a defense because liability was based on the ac-
countant's failure to perform the procedures that they had agreed to do and claimed to
have done. Further, the imposition of liability was not affected by the existence of a dis-
claimer of reliability. The Hedley Byrne case, on the other hand, presents a factual
situation wherein disclaimer was a successful defense.
The Rusch court found the correct measure of damages to be the same as that ap-
plied where the parties are in privity, or the amount necessary to place the corporation
in the position it would have been in had the account been correctly stated. For exam-
ple, the accountant's negligence produced errors of $33,069.22. The court subtracted
$5,000 as the margin of error beyond which the accountants had not warranted cor-
rectness and added $1,380 as the reasonable cost of producing a corrected report, to pro-
duce a sum of $30,069.22. See 170 N.W.2d at 407. Thus the damages were the same
as if the parties had contracted for the services.
Most recently, in Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th
Cir. 1971), the court refused to accept the inroads made by Rusch Factors and Ryan,
noting that the forum state (Colorado) had not yet adopted the developing, trend. The
decision can be distinguished from Rusch Factors and Ryan, however, because of the
finding that the accountants had exercised due care.
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The wisdom of the decision in Ultramares has been doubted...
and this court shares the doubt. Why should an innocent reliant
party be forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's pro-
fessional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed
and fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting profession,
which can pass the cost of insuring against the risk onto its custom-
ers, who can in turn pass the cost onto the entire consuming pub-
lic? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the caution-
ary techniques of the accounting profession? For these reasons it
appears to this court that the decision in Ultramares constitutes an
unwarranted inroad upon the principle that "[tIhe risk reasonably
to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."
As further support for its decision the court in Rusch Factors
also cited the proposed section on negligent misrepresentation in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts which would extend the ac-
countant's liability to "the person or one of the persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information, or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it."43  The same tenta-
tive draft included the following hypothetical illustration of the
above-stated rule of law:
A is negotiating with a bank for a credit of $50,000. The
bank requires an audit by certified public accountants. A employs
B & Company, a firm of accountants, to make the audit, telling them
he is going to negotiate a bank loan. A does not get his loan
from the first bank but does negotiate a loan with another bank,
which relies upon B & Company's certified statements. The audit
carelessly overstates the financial resources of A, and in conse-
quence the second bank suffers pecuniary loss. B & Company is
subject to liability to the second bank. 44
The holding in Rusch Factors that an accountant should be lia-
ble in negligence for careless misrepresentation relied upon by ac-
tually foreseen and limited classes of persons suggests a trend away
from mechanical application of the Ultramares decision. The test
created by the court in Rusch Factors appears to be sound. It
avoids the unlimited and unforeseen liability that Cardozo feared
would result from finding liability on the facts presented in Ultra-
mares, and represents a return to the basic "foreseeability" rule cre-
ated in Palsgraf.45
42 284 F. Supp. at 90, 91, citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344,
162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
44 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, Comments and Explanatory Notes, § 552,
at 13-16, 23-25 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
4 5 See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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B. Liability for Deceit
An action in deceit has traditionally been available to any party
who has justifiably relied on the intentional misrepresentation of a
material fact." In accountant's liability cases, the greatest concern
is caused by the requirement of scienter, or guilty intent. Intent
can be established not only by proof of actual knowledge of the
falsity of the representation, but also by proving lack of knowl-
edge of its truth or reckless disregard for the truth.47 Negligence
is not a substitute for intent, but it may nevertheless be evidence
that the defendant's assertion was not made with an honest belief
in the truth of the statement.48
Ultramares v. Touche49 clearly presents the distinctions be-
tween intentional and negligent misrepresentation. In that case,
the failure of the defendants to verify $706,000 of accounts receiv-
able, an entry which later proved to be fictitious, was held to create
a jury question on allegations of fraud. Cardozo observed that
the defendants' act of certifying the financial statements as being
true to the best of their knowledge when, as a jury might find, they
had no knowledge of the facts, could support a finding that they
had acted without a sincere and honest belief in the truth of the
statements." If the jury did find that the facts supported the allega-
tions of fraud, the accountant would be liable to those persons whom
he reasonably should have foreseen would be injured by his mis-
representations.8 ' As discussed previously, the scope of liability
for negligence is significantly more limited. The difference here is
grounded on the policy that liability for the intentional wrongdoer
should be greater than for the negligent wrongdoer.82 The rule is
also intended to deter future misconduct.5 3
This facet of the Ultramares holding was later applied in the
4 6 See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS § 102, at 713-19 (3d ed. 1964).
47 In the leading case on deceit the House of Lords declared that for a deceit action
to lie there must be proof that a "false representation has been made (1) knowingly,
or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly careless of whether it be true or false."
Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (1889).
48Id. at 375-76.
49 255 N.Y. 170, 174 NX.E. 441 (1931).
50 Id. at 192-93, 174 N.E. at 449-50.
51Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38 TEXAs L REv. 439, 440 n.6 (1960).
52 Keeton, The Ambit of a Fraudulent Representor's Liability, 17 TEXS L. REV.
1, 4 (1938); Seavey, supra note 51, at 440-41.
53 Comment, Accountants' Liabilities to Third Parties Under Common Law and Fed-
eral Securities Law, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L REV. 137, 143 (1967).
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case of State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst.54 In that situation, the defen-
dant accountants released to their client a certified balance sheet
which listed accounts receivable valued at 2,000,000 dollars with-
out disclosing that over 768,000 dollars of these accounts were stag-
nant and probably would never be collected. The balance sheet
was used to obtain credit from the plaintiff, and the accountants
had been made aware that the balance sheet was to be used for
that purpose. Thirty days after the plaintiff received the balance
sheet, and after the loan had been made, the accountants sent to
their client an explanatory letter containing comments and expla-
nations of the balance sheet which had not appeared on the dis-
tributed report. The corporation failed and the creditors sued the
accountants, alleging fraud. The trial court set aside a verdict for
the plaintiffs and directed a verdict for the defendants. The New
York Court of Appeals reversed, elaborating on the relationship
between negligence and fraud, reiterating principles laid down in U1-
tramares, and holding that accountants may be liable to third par-
ties in deceit even where deliberate or active fraud is lacking. The
court suggested that statements certified as true when there is no
actual knowledge as to that truth, reckless misstatements, or pro-
fessional opinions based on obviously flimsy grounds should be
sufficient bases for liability:
A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful,
if sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading to an inference
of fraud so as to impose liability for losses suffered by those who
rely .... In other words, heedlessness and reckless disregard of
consequence may take the place of deliberate intention.55
Thus, the State Street case underscores the fact that there is no
clear line between fraud and gross negligence. 56 In sum, there is a
possibility of recovering from an accountant for deceit where there
is a showing of intentional or reckless misrepresentation in a bal-
ance sheet upon which the creditor or investor has justifiably relied
to his detriment.
C. The Duty to Disclose After-Acquired Facts
The possibility of a duty of care arising subsequent to the certi-
fication of a financial statement has been raised in the case of
Fischer v. Kletz.57  In denying the accounting firm's motion to dis-
54 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
55 278 N.Y. at 112, 15 N.E.2d at 418-19.
56 See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
57 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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miss, a United States district court implied that the accountants
who failed to disclose after-acquired information might be found
liable, in deceit, to investors who had relied on the previously certi-
fied financial statements.
Fischer began as a class action for damages brought by current
and former stockholders and bondholders of the Yale Express Sys-
stem, Inc. against the public accounting firm of Peat-Marwick-Mitch-
ell & Co. (PMM). PMM had been employed by Yale to prepare
and certify the corporation's 1963 financial statements.5 8 The annual
report and PMM's certification were issued to Yale stockholders on
April 9, 1964, and approximately three months later a report con-
taining certified financial statements was filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). Subsequent to filing those
statements PMM was commissioned to conduct special studies of
Yale's past and current income and expenses. While conducting
the special studies, PMM discovered that the certified 1963 annual
report had contained figures that were substantially false and mis-
leading. If was not until May 5, 1965, that PMM communicated
its discoveries to the SEC and the stock exchanges on which Yale
stock was registered although PMM had notified Yale's manage-
ment of their findings prior to November, 1964. The plaintiffs
claimed that as a result of PMM's silence they suffered pecuniary
damages and based their claim on both common law deceit and
various violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342i
The alleged breach of duty confronting the court in the deceit
action was a nondisclosure rather than an affirmative misrepresen-
tation. While nondisclosure has in the past been the basis of
deceit actions, liability in those cases was predicated on the exis-
tence of a fiduciary relationship, 60 or the fact that the persons in-
volved were parties to a business transaction.01 The Fischer court
58 Since Yale securities were registered on a national securities exchange it was re-
quired to have its annual report certified by an independent public accountant and filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Securities Exchange Act § 13(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1964).
59 15 U.S.C. § 78(r) (1964). See text accompanying notes 102, 109 infra for k
discussion of the claims under the Securities Act.
60 See Foreman v. Henry, 87 Okla. 272, 210 P. 1026 (1922); DeSwarte v. First Na-
tional Bank, 188 Wis. 455, 206 N.W. 887 (1926).
6 1 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 551(2) (b) (1938). "One party to a business
transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other, before the
transaction is consummated ... any subsequently acquired information which he recog-
nizes as making untrue or misleading a previous representation which when made was
true or believed to be so." See, e.g., Loewer v. Harris, 57 F. 368 (2d Cir. 1893), (seller
of business held liable for nondisclosure of a change of business conditions for failing
to disclose a downturn of business after having previously reported an upward trend).
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found that the effect of the certification was similar to a representa-
tion made in a business transaction in that it supplied information
which was justifiably relied on for decisional purposes.62 The
court further concluded that the significant factor was the impact
made by the representation upon the person who relied on it.63
Of further consideration in Fischer was the question whether
gain by the defendant is a necessary element in an action based on
nondisclosure. The Court relied on the case of Goldsmith v. Koop-
man64 for the proposition that proof of such gain is unnecessary
in actions based on nondisclosure. In Goldsmith, the court had
underscored the fact that in actions for nondisclosure the com-
plainants are hurt, and that this, rather than defendants' gain, is the
gravamen of the action. 5
The Fischer court thus effectively broadened the scope of the
common law action of deceit to include after-acquired informa-
tion which discloses the falsity of a party's certification of a finan-
cial statement. If the accountants knew at the time they made
their certification that the balance sheet contained substantial er-
rors, the accountants would be liable for their false representa-
tions.6 It does not follow that a different concept of liability
should be applied merely because the knowledge of the falsity is
acquired at a later time.
It is undeniable that the imposition of liability for nondisclo-
sure of post-certification errors will increase costs to the accounting
profession and have some disruptive effect on the securities mar-
kets, but these costs are dearly outweighed by the disruptions of
the securities markets which can occur if the accountant does not
publicize his later findings of error in certified financial statements.
D. The Federal Securities Laws
Events leading up to and following the stock market crash of
1929 made it clear that federal regulation of securities practices
was necessary to protect the investing public.67  Congress chose to
protect the public by requiring full disclosure of relevant informa-
tion in the issue of securities rather than passing on the quality of
62266 F. Supp. at 186.
63 266 F. Supp. at 185-86.
64 140 F. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1905).
651d. at 621.
06 See State Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
67 Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Gno. WAsH.
.L REv. 29, at 29-30 (1959).
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the security.68  The main thrust of the federal legislation was
expressed by its sponsors as being to "place the owners of securi-
ties on a parity, so far as possible, with the management of corpor-
ations, and to place the buyer on the same plane so far as available
information is concerned, with the seller."6"
The independent public accountant has been given a central re-
sponsibility in the application of these statutes. When investi-
gating the financial condition of corporations, the investing public
looks to annual reports, prospectuses, and registration statements'
and relies especially upon the statements of accountants, because of
their independence and expertise. Certification by an accountant,
as required under the statutes, serves as a check on management's
accounting. If based on an extensive and expert review of financial
statements and underlying records and procedures, certification pro-
vides adequate assurances that these statements fairly present the
affairs of the company.70
To ensure a high standard of performance by accountants
under the federal securities statutes, the scope of civil liability to
third parties has been substantially expanded. As James Landis,
one of the drafters of the Securities Act of 1933, stated: "We were
particularly anxious through the imposition of adequate civil liabil-
ities to assure the performance by corporate directors and officers
of their fiduciary obligations and to impress upon accountants the
necessity for independence and a thorough professional approach." 71
The foll6wing portion of this article will consider the accoun-
tant's exposure to civil liability under both the Securities Act of,
1933-72 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193471 through an anal-
ysis of the civil liabilities sections of the acts and judicial authority
interpreting those sections.
1. The Securities Act .of 1933.- Key provisions of the 1933
Act, directed at achieving full disclosure in securities registration
statements and prospectuses, require that various financial facts be in-
duded in the statements. Balance sheets and profit and loss state-
ments "in such detail and such form as the Commission shall pre-
6
sSee generally 1 L. Loss, SECuRmTIES REGULATION 121-28 (2d ed. 1961); Knauss,
A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 607 (1964).
69 77 CoNG. REc. 2918 (1933) (remarks of Congressman Raybun related specifi-
cally to what was to become the Securities Act of 1933).
70 See Barr and Koch, Accounting and the S.E.C., 28 GEo. WASHI. L REV. 176 at
186-87 (1959).
71 Landis, supra note 67, at 35 (emphasis added).
72 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1964).
73 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1964).
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scribe" 4 are required, and these financial statements must be certi-
fied by an independent public or certified accountant.75
Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes civil liability for misrep-
resentations or omissions of material facts in the registration state-
ment.76 A prequisite to liability under this section is that the omis-
sion or misstatement be material. Whether a particular fact is
material will depend on the facts and parties involved in each case
- what is important to the seasoned speculator will not be material
to the small investor. As to the average investor, most courts adopt
a standard similar to that in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corpo-
ration,7 where Judge McLean said:
The average prudent investor is not concerned with minor
inaccuracies or with errors as to matters which are of no interest
to him. The facts which tend to deter him from purchasing a se-
curity are facts which have an important bearing upon the nature
or condition of the issuing corporation or its business. 78
Section 11 expands accountants' third-party liability significantly
beyond that of common law. Privity is not a necessary element un-
der section 11, and the misrepresentation need not be addressed to
nor intended to influence the investor. Moreover, there is no re-
quirement of scienter, and consequently no proof of fraud or deceit
74 Schedule A 55 25-26, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (25)-(26) (1964).
751d.
76 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964). Subsection (a) provides that whenever a registration
statement becomes effective and contains an untrue statement of a material fact, or omits
a material fact which is required to be stated, or which is necessary to keep the statement
from being misleading, any person acquiring the security:
may, either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction sue -
(1) every person who signed the registration srttement;
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession
gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been
-named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or
as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connec-
tion with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in such regis-
tration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been prepared or
certified by him.... (emphasis added).
77 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
78 Id. at 681. But see Address by Louis Loss, American Bar Association Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Sept. 27, 1968, ("The BarChis Case: Pros-
pectus Liability") reprinted in 24 Bus. LAWYER 527, at 532-33 (1969), in which Pro-
fessor Loss indicated that the cases under sections 11 and lob-5 which have proceeded
to final judgment for the plaintiff have not really posed questions of materiality but
rather have been cases which have been extraordinary. What has evolved under the
case law has been something closer to a "special circumstance" doctrine. See S.E.C. v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co:, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968)
(large ore strike); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956) (corpora-
tion quadrupled its tobacco inventory).
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is necessary for a section 11 claim.79 Proof of reliance is eliminated
under the section except in one narrow instance.80 Thus, the legal
rules and requirements that made finding accountants liable to third
parties so difficult under the common law have been largely elimi-
nated.
There are, however, three defenses built into the statute.81 The
accountant will not be held liable if he can prove that: (1) he had
ceased to act as accountant before the effective date of the registra-
tion on which liability is asserted, and that he had informed the
Securities Exchange Commision of that fact; or (2) part of the reg-
istration statement became effective without his knowledge, and that
he had informed the Commission and given reasonable public no-
tice of that fact; or (3) he had, after reasonable investigation, rea-
sonable grounds to believe, and did in fact believe, that at the time
the statement became effective the statements it contained were true,
complete as to all material facts, and not misleading.82 The Act
defines' what constitutes reasonable investigation and reasonable
grounds for belief as "the standard of reasonableness... required of
a prudent man in the management of his own property. 8
Although section 11 provides the foundation for extremely
broad third-party liability, it has f6stered relatively few suits involv-
ing accountants. In Shonts v. Hirliman,84 an early case brought
against an accountant under section 11, the purchasers of registered
securities were denied recovery from the accountants and directors
of the corporation. The complaint in Shonts alleged that financial
statements prepared by the defendant accountant made no mention
of a material fact - namely, the existence of a rental agreement.
The rental agreement was, however, entered into subsequent to the
time of certification and filing of the registration statement, but prior
to the date on which the registration statement became effective.
79 See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
8 0 The exception is set forth at 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964), as follows:
If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made generally
available to its security holders an earning statement covering a period of at
least twelve months beginning after the effective date of registration statement,
then the right of recovery under this subsection shall be conditioned on proof
that such person acquired the security relying upon such untrue statement in
the registration statement or relying upon the registration statement and not
knowing of such omission but such reliance may be established without proof
of the reading of the registration statement by such person. Id.
8iSee 15 U.S.C § 77k(b) (1)-(3) (1964).
8 2 This last, "due diligence," defense is the most significant. See Id.
83 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1964).
84 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
1971]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:113
The court held that there could be no recovery against the accoun-
tants because there was no omission or misrepresentation of a ma-
terial fact at the time that the registration statement was certified.
The court interpreted section 11 as not covering the situation in which
the accountant did not know of a subsequent undertaking by his
dient.85
Shonts represents an extremely early interpretation of section 11.
The court's holding that section 11 responsibility for accountants is
terminated with the date of certification of the statement plainly
contradicts the words of the statute itself. The language of section
11 gives the accountant a defense only if he believed, after reason-
able investigation, that the statements were true at the time that the
registration statement became effective.8
The erroneous interpretation given by the Shonts court has sub-
sequently been corrected in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,8 7
the first definitive decision imposing liability on accountants under
section 11. The BarChris Corporation was in the business of con-
structing bowling alleys for purchasers who merely made small down
payments prior to construction and, when the building was finished,
paid the balance of the contract price in long term notes. The notes
were then discounted by BarChris. BarChris' business grew dra-
matically and its capital structure became increasingly complex. In
1961, the corporation sold debentures to the public and the finan-
cial statements for the registration statements were certified by Bar-
Chris' regular auditors. A year later BarChris became insolvent
and an action was brought by purchasers of the debentures against
the directors, officers, underwriters, and auditors.
Accountants for BarChris sought to avoid liability by pleading
due diligence in the preparation of the financial statements, a de-
fense available under section 11.'8 Under the Shonts rationale the
defense would probably have been successful. But the BaiChris
court upheld liability under section 11 and directed its inquiry to
the question of whether a reasonable investigation had been under-
85 Specifically the court declared:
The rental arrangement was not called to their [the accountants') attention.
There was no entry on the books at their disposal, from which, by further in-
quiry, they might have discovered that there was such an undertaking. Absent
these, they cannot be charged with a misrepresentation which was made later -
long after their certification. Id. at 483.
86 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B)(i) (1964).
87 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8 8 See note 82 supra & accompanying text.
ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY
taken by the accountants prior to the effective date of the registra-
tion statement.
In order to determine whether a reasonable investigation had
been made, the court co'nsidered not only the adequacy of the 1960
audit, upon which the registration statement was based, but also the
statutorily required "S-i" review of that audit, which must be
made prior to the time the registration statement becomes effec-
tive." The court paid particular attention to the fact that the ef-
fective date of a registration statement cannot predate this re-evalu-
ation and updating of the client's financial position. The S-1 review
took on much significance in BarChris because many important
changes had occurred in the corporation's financial position between
the date of the audit and the effective date of registration. The
S-1 review had failed to reveal those changes."
The accountant's "due-diligence" defense was rejected because
the court felt that the S-1 review did not meet the recognized stan-
dards of the accounting profession. 1  More specifically, the court
found that the accountant in charge of the review had not followed
the complete procedure outlined in his firm's written program for
such a review, did not spend enough time "on a task of this magni-
tude, [and mosti important of all, . . .was too easily satisfied with
glib answers to his inquiries. "92
Although the BarChris court purported to adopt the standards
of the accounting profession itself as the gauge of a "reasonable
investigation" under section 11, the court did little to resolve the
problem of determining when the S-1 review is adequate. One still
does not know what answers by company officials are to be classified
as "glib," nor does one know what shall constitute a "danger signal"
appearing in the financial reports that is sufficient to require further
investigation. One commentator has examined the facts in BarChris
and concluded that "it is difficult to see wherein the auditors failed
to make a 'reasonable investigation' in the course of the S-1 re-
89 The accountant carries out an S-1 review as part of his obligation under § 11. The
section makes the accountant responsible for his opinion upon the audited financial state-
ments as of the effective date of the registration statement. The effective date will not
occur until sometime after the accountant has completed his audit and issued his opin-
ion. He must satisfy himself that the audited financial statements still present the finan-
cial position and results of operations as of the end of the audited period at the effective
date of the registration statement.
9 0 See 283 F. Supp. at 702. Several errors were also made in the 1960 audit itself.
Their significance is discussed by the court at 698-701.
91 Id. at 703. See also CoMm. oN AuDITING PROCEDURE, supra note 8, at 76.
92 283 F. Supp. at 703.
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view""3 and that even if the accountant had learned all that the court
indicated a diligent S-1 review would have exposed, it would not
have made a significant difference in those statements which the court
found to be materially in error.94  If this interpretation of the facts
in BarChris is correct, then the court did not hold the accountant
only to the standard recognized in the accounting profession but, in
fact, fashioned a higher standard of it own.
BarChris is significant in that it is the first case to impose liabil-
ity on accountants under section 11. As such, it breathes life into a
previously little-used statutory provision. The case emphasizes the
importance of the S-1 review and suggests that the standards for the
S-1 review need to be re-examined by the accounting profession.
2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934.- Under the Exchange
Act, accountants' liability for misleading statements is founded upon
the express liability of section 18," and the liability implied under
sections 10(b) 6 and the SEC rule 10b-5.97  The Exchange Act re-
quires the filing of various reports as well as registration applications
with the SEC by companies whose securities are listed upon national
exchanges and most issues traded in the over-the-counter market.98
Generally, the financial statements must be certified by independent
public or certified accountants. 9
(a) Express Liability.- Section 18 of the 1934 Act 00 expressly
93 Address by A. A. Sommer, Jr., American Bar Association Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law, Sept. 27, 1968, ("The BarChris Case: Prospectus Liability"),
reprinted in 24 Bus. LAwYER 593 at 602-03 (1969).
94 Id. at 605.
95 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964).
96 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
97 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967).
98 See Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
1964 DUKE L.J. 706.
99 See Lee & Hall, Accounting Aspects Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 20
Bus. LAW 325 (1965).
100 Section 18 reads in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any ap-
plication, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or reg-
ulation thereunder . . . which statement was at the time and in the light of the
circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any
material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement
was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have pur-
chased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for
damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he
acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or
misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may,
in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such
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creates liability for those persons who make false or misleading state-
ments on any document filed with a national securities exchange.
Like section 11 of the 1933 Act, it requires that the misstatement be
material. Unlike section 11, however, section 18 allows a defense
of good faith where a defendant had no knowledge that the state-
ment was false or misleading.
Section 18 requires scienter, causation and reliance, none of
which are required when dealing with registration statements under
section 11 of the 1933 Act. Section 18 seems to have added very
little to the prospects of successful recovery. by investors for false or
misleading statements against accountants beyond common law de-
ceit actions and section 11 actions. As Professor Loss has pointed
out:
Except for avoiding any question that the person making the false
statement or 'causing it to be made can be sued by the buyer.or
seller notwithstanding the, absence of. privity between them, it
i hard to see what advantage § 18 gives the investor that he does
not have in commoi law deceit.' 0'
Regardless of the utility of section 18 in protecting investors,
judicial authority has made it clear that accountants are indeed sub-
ject to its express liability. In Fischer v. Kletz,10 2 a plaintiff alleged
that accountants charged with preparation of a. report required by
the SEC knew, in advance of filing, that certified statements were
false. The district court declared that these facts, if established,
would support the imposition of liability upon accountants under
section 18.103
(b) Implied Liability.- Of prime significance to the accountant
is the judicial recognition of implied civil liability under section
10(b)104 of the 1934 Act and SEC rule lob-5,'0° which represent the
suit, and assess reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, against
either party litigant. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964).
1013 L Loss, SEcURrrIEs REGULATION 1752 (1961).
102 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
103 Id. at 189.
104 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange -....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
105 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
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antifraud backbone of the Act. Although neither section 10(b) nor
rule 10b-5 expressly provides for civil liability, the courts have con-
sistently inferred a civil remedy.'
Implied civil liability for accountants under rule 10b-5 was first
recognized in H.L. Green Company v. Childree,107 where it was
alleged that the defendant auditors had knowingly prepared false
financial statements with the intent to induce the plaintiff to enter
into a merger with their client. Since section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
are concerned with fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, it is at once difficult to see how the accountants who pre-
pared the statements, as opposed to the seller who used the state-
ments, could be named as defendants. The court, however, found
that an accountant could indeed be liable to an investor under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5 even though his activities were confined
to the preparation of the false and misleading statements. Implicit
in the Childree decision is the determination that the accountant's
activities were undertaken in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.
Childree thus raises the significant problem of defining the "in
connection with" concept of section 10(b) and rule lob-5. The
phrase has been broadly construed to apply to any practices that are
likely to mislead investors to their detriment, 0 8 and courts are now
considering the requirement satisfied if the misled plaintiff is reason-
ably within the "scope of influence" of the person making the state-
ments on which the plaintiff relied.'0 9  The best known judicial ex-
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
106 See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind.
1966); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
107 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
108 Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969).
10 9RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 531 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966) reads as
follows:
GENERAL RULE
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss
(a) to the persons or class of persons whom he intends or has reason to
expect to act or refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation; and
(b) for pecuniary loss suffered by them through their reliance in the
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position of the scope of influence test is that of Judge Waterman in
S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur."0 He declared: "Rule 10b-5 is vio-
lated whenever assertions are made.., in a manner reasonably cal-
culated to influence the investing public."111
Other decisions have applied the scope of influence interpretation
of section 10 (b) and rule 10b-5 with respect to accountants' liability.
For example, in Fischer v. Kletz,"2 the court was faced with a com-
plaint alleging that the defendant-accountants had recommended the
use of misleading figures in a financial statement which they had
neither prepared nor certified. The court held that it could be pos-
sible to find that the plaintiff had been within the "scope of influ-
ence" of the accountants' actions, and refused to dismiss the com-
plaint.
Some indication of the limits of the "scope of influence" test
were set forth in Wessel v. Buhler.13 Certain financial statements
had been prepared by the defendant-accountant for administrative
corporate purposes, but were never publicly disseminated or seen
by an investor until after the litigation was commenced. The first
of these statements was prepared to accompany an application for a
surety bond, the second was a balance sheet that accompanied an
application for a small business administration loan, and the third
was an audited balance sheet used by the corporation itself. Each
statement showed deficiencies in the corporate records and indicated
that the company was in serious trouble. Subsequently, the corpo-
ration issued a misleading prospectus containing some of the figures
which the defendant-accountant had prepared for the earlier state-
ments. The district court imposed liability upon the accountant on
the basis of those figures." 4
But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hold the ac-
countant liable for the misleading prospectus. Applying the "scope
of influence" test, the court was unable to find any connection be-
tween the stock transaction and the accountant's preparation of the
earlier financial reports sufficient to satisfy the test and impose
liability under section 10(b) and rule lob-5.
type of transaction in which he intends or has reason to expect their conduct
to be influenced.
110 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub, vom., Kline v. S.E.C., 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
Mn 401 F.2d at 862. See generally 401 F.2d at 858-62.
11 266 F Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
113437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
31Id. at 281.
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Fischer and Wessel can also be contrasted by their dispositions
of the allegations that the accountants should be liable under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule lob-5 for "aiding and abetting" schemes to de-
fraud investors." 5 The question utmost in the mind of the Fischer
court was whether the accountants, in recommending the use of the
inaccurate figures, had given substantial assistance or encouragement
to the corporate officials. Although he doubted that this could be
proven, Judge Tyler refused to dismiss the complaint without giving
the plaintiffs further opportunity to develop the facts. In Wessel,
the facts developed at trial did not show any affirmative evidence
that the accountant had substantially encouraged those who prepared
the misleading prospectuses. The court, therefore, affirmed the trial
court's directed verdict for the accountant.
Neither the Wessel nor the Fischer courts would declare that
accountants could be held liable under rule lob-5 solely for failing
to publicly disclose that misleading figures were being used. The
Fischer court concluded that an alleged "aiding or abetting" based
on non-disclosure of after-acquired knowledge of error with respect
to prior false statements would be difficult to prove." 6 There is,
however, some authority for imposing a duty on accountants to
speak out under appropriate circumstances. In Brennan v. Mid-
western United Life Insurance Company,"7 a case not involving
accountants, the court refused to dismiss a complaint alleging that
the defendant's silence and inaction was sufficient encouragement
to constitute an "aiding and abetting" of a violation of the statute.
The court explained that "to rest the definition of aiding and abet-
ting solely on abstract and mechanical distinctions between active
and passive assistance ... would be to defeat and hamper the intel-
ligent and responsible development of the law .... .. 18 Under
the Brennan approach it may be possible for an accountant to sub-
115 For purposes of defining "aiding and abetting" under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 the courts have adopted the standard set forth in the Restatement of Torts:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a
person is liable if he
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives sub-
stantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself. RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 976 (1938).
116 Compare 266 F. Supp. at 196 with 437 F.2d at 283.
117 259 F. Supp. 673 at 682 (1966). In the decision on the merits, Judge Eschbach
based his finding for plaintiff on affirmative acts but repeated his belief that such acts
might not always be necessary. 286 F. Supp. 702 at 727 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417
F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
1181d. at 682.
ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY
stantially encourage violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 by
keeping silent, and thereby incur liability.
There are other factors to be considered before it can be con-
cluded that imposition of such a duty is desirable. Professor Brom-
berg has expressed the fear that bystanders could be found liable
as easily as violators, because the standards for aiding and abetting
are too vague.' He suggests that a higher level of knowledge or
benefit should be required before a failure to speak out can be con-
sidered aiding and abetting. These additional requirements, how-
ever, may be little help to the accounting profession. Although
the benefit contemplated by Professor Bromberg is something more
than the benefit of receiving a fee for professional services, 20 a strong
argument can be made for imputing a high level of knowledge to
accountants because of their dose association with a client's finan-
cial records. No court has as yet adopted the Brennan theory regard-
ing silence and, in fact, the Fischer and Wessel courts specifically
refused to do so. But it remains impossible to say that under no set
of facts could an accountant give "substantial encouragement or as-
sistance" to violators of the securities laws by failing to disclose the
potential fraud.
The reliance that the public justifiably places in the affirmative
representations of independent public accountants has led to other
burdens being imposed on them under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
Because of this special reliance, the court in Drake v. Thor Power
Company' declared that it was not necessary that the misrepresen-
tation be intentional in order for an accountant to be held respon-
sible where there is reliance because the effect on the investor is the
same regardless of intent. This also obviates the need for the de-
frauded party to prove that the accountant benefitted from the mis-
representation.' Privity also is not required.12
Thus it is apparent that accountants can be liable for any mis-
leading statement that can be reasonably construed as being "in con-
nection with" the purchase or sale of securities. They also may be
liable if any of their activities can be construed as encouraging the
"19A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAWS: FRAUD - S.E.C. RULE 10B-5 § 8.5, at 533
(1969).
1201d. § 8.5 at 584.
121282 F. Supp. at 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
122 See 282 F. Supp. at 105.
123 See BROMBERG, note 121 supra, at 583. Professor Bromberg states that the stan-
dard articulated in Drake is the most relaxed yet under rule 10b-5 and that it may apply
only to independent certifying accountants.
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use of misleading statements in a transaction. Accountants should
be aware that potential civil liability under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 has made them responsible to the purchaser rather than their
client. In this way, the goal of full and fair disclosure in securities
transactions can be attained.
E. Threat of Criminal Action
Recent case authority has added a new dimension to accoun-
tants' liability to clients and third parties. In United States v. Si-
mon 2 4 the court of appeals affirmed the imposition of criminal pen-
alties upon accountants who failed to disclose information regarding
the likelihood of an affiliate's outstanding debt being repaid, knowl-
edge of which they had learned in the course of preparing a routine
annual audit. The accountants were aware of the fact that collateral
used to secure the particular debt was in fact inadequate 25 and that
the debt itself had been improperly indicated on the financial state-
ments. The accountants certified the statements and soon thereafter
the company failed. The Government charged the accountants with
the violation of federal statutes which prohibit the filing of false
financial reports with the United States,2" mail fraud, 2 ' and filing
false reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 28
At the trial there was conflicting testimony by expert witnesses
as to whether applicable professional standards required disclosure
in this situation. The eight defense experts129 all agreed that neither
generally accepted accounting principles nor auditing standards re-
quired disclosure of the nature of the collateral or the increase in
the receivables. On the other hand, the Government's two experts
presented conflicting testimony. 30  All of the expert witnesses agreed
that there is no official declaration by either the Accounting Insti-
tute or the SEC which recognizes a specific obligation either to re-
quire disclosure or to inquire into affiliates. The court determined
that the issues of whether the financial statements fairly presented
124 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cer. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970).
12 5 The bulk of the collateral, approximately 80 percent. was the company's own stock
and convertible debentures.
126 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
127 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
128 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1964).
129 Defendant's eight expert witnesses were six accounting practitioners, a professor
of accounting, and a former Chief Accountant of the SEC.
130 The government's two expert witnesses were the Chief Accountant of the SEC
and an SEC staff accountant.
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the financial position of the company, and whether the defendants
acted in good faith should be determined by the jury. The jury
subsequently convicted the defendants on all counts.' 31  In affirm-
ing the conviction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the jury was not bound to accept expert testimony
that an honest judgment had been made by the defendants, and that
the finding of the jury was reasonable. 2
Simon underscores the need for the accounting profession to es-
tablish more uniform standards with a narrowed range of choices so
that a more objective basis for evaluating an auditor's professional
performance can be established.'33 The case also shows the need
for the accounting profession to educate the public on the function
performed by an auditor and the responsibility assumed by the certify-
ing auditor. Criminal prosecutions will probably continue to play
a minor role compared to civil, administrative, and professional ac-
tions in ensuring that accountants live. up to the standards and
principles laid down by the profession and the courts.
CONCLUSION
The siglificant number of law suits. instituted 'by investors
against accountants has resulted in plaintiffs' recovering against ac-
countants in heretofore untested situations. Accountants.will likely
be able. to resist their clients' attempts to infltience the content of
financial statements once they point to examples in- which accoun-
tants have been held liable to investors. The financial statements
which the independent public accountant audits and certifies are re-
lied upon'by creditors and investors as representing fully and fairly
the financial condition of his client. Thus, the accountant shares the
responsibility as a party with superior knowledge, to prevent fraud
and make disclosure of facts which he learns are erroneous. The
accounting profession can either take the preferred path of, greater
self-regulation or expect an increasing number of civil and cfiininal
cases imposing ever broader liability, on the profession.
1 31 No jail sentences were imposed but the defendants were fined up to $7,000.
1 3 2 See 425 F.2d at 806.
133 For the same conclusion see, Note, Federal Criminal and Administrative Controls
for Auditors: The Need for a Consistent Standard, 1969 WAsH. U.L.Q. 187. See also
Note, Accountants - Auditors - Compliance with General Accounting Principles Not
a Complete Defense to Criminal Fraud, 23 VAND. L REV. 809 (1970).
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